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Abstract: Many macroeconomists and politicans claim that fi scal austerity – getting the budget defi -
cit down immediately – would be good for employment and growth. We think that fi s-
cal stimulus is expansionary, and fi scal contraction is contractionary. There is a large and 
growing body of literature that shows that fi scal expansion can help economy to grow and 
reduce unemployment in near term; that certain types of fi scal stimulus are very effective 
and that fi scal contractions tend to lower output and employment in the short run. Fiscal 
austerity may be desirable for the long-term solvency and health of the economy. But it 
lowers growth and raises unemployment in the near term. A policy mix between new mon-
etary strategy (nominal GDP targeting) and fi scal stimulus would be especially effective. 
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Introduction
If we want to talk about austerity measures we have to go back to the theoretical 
background of economics of monetary union and open economy macroeconomics 
(De Grauwe, 2007.; Lapavitsas, 2012). 
Optimum Currency Areas Theory 
Countries can use national monetary policies, including exchange rate changes, to 
make balance-of-payments adjustments in case of demand shocks (reduced output 
and higher unemployment). Members of monetary union have different mechanisms, 
bacuse they don’t have national monetary policy: wage fl exilibility (and mobility of 
labour).  This will require country-member of monetary union to follow defl ationary 
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policies, which in turn will constrain the growth process. Thus, a monetary union has 
a cost for the growing country. 
It will fi nd more advantageous to keep its national currency, so as to have the 
option of depreciatiang its currency when it fi nds itself constrained by unfavourable 
developments in its trade account. 
Fiscal policies are implemented at national levels, but monetary policies are cen-
tralized (ECB and Target-2 payment system) and therefore cease to be a source of 
asymmetric shocks. But, although monetary and economic integration can weaken 
the occurrence of asymmetric shocks, the existence of nation-states, i.e. the level of 
political integration, with their own specifi c will be contiuned source of asymmetric 
disturbances in a monetary union.
In the analysis of Mundell, who pioneered „theory of optimum currency area“ in his 
celebrated article 1961, a depreciation is a fl exible instrument that can be used frequent-
ly in balance-of-payments adjustments, which could infl uence output and employment. 
The absence of national monetary and exchange rate policies to assist in the adjustment 
process will be felt as a macroeconomic cost of the monetary union. This is very im-
portant conclusion for Croatia, as a new EU member. As we can see, the hard core of 
the OCA analysis still stands. Although exchange rate volatility can be an independent 
source of asymmetric shocks, it is still true that large shocks can occur which can more 
easily be dealt with when the exchange rate can be allowed to adjust. 
Open Economy Macroeconomics 
Let us suppose a simple model of balance-of-payments policy. A country is a two-
sector economy: tradables and non-tradables. National economy has a current ac-
count defi cit. By fi scal contraction (austerity measures) absorption/domestic demand 
will be reduced. The role of monetary policy would be to manage exchange rate. 
To simplify, fi scal policy could be targeted on absorption (real spending cuts, so-
called „disabsorption“), and monetary policy on the exchange rate, in order to achieve 
the so-called „internal and external balance“. This is a „two-targets two-instruments“ 
strategy. Essentially, appropriate disabsorption (budget cuts, austerity) and relative 
price change/switching, like a devaluation are likely to be needed. 
To simplify, it follows that when the spending cuts/austerity measures are associ-
ated with the right switching policy/devaluation, the budget cuts need not be as great 
as when the whole balance-of-payments adjustment process has to be brought about 
by an absorption reduction on its own. 
But, members of the eurozone are not able to have a switching policy, and auster-
ity measures are considered as the main policy instrument for adjustment process, 
which is politically very painful. This is so-called „internal devaluation“, essentially 
an attempt to reduce real wages in order to regain international competitiveness. 
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Some fl exibility in eurozone could be found in unconventional monetary policy of 
the ECB (Quantitative Easing - QE), that ECB/ESCB started to follow by the end of 
last year introducing new refi nancing facilities (Emergency Liquidity Assistance - ELA 
and Long – Term Refi nancing Operations - LTRO). Expansionary monetary policy and 
weakening of the euro (against dollar) could bring positive effects as any other switch-
ing policy and to some extent could ease political pressure on fi scal policy. 
The Issue
This is not the place to review in detail the large literature on the effect of fi scal 
policy on economy. We think that fi scal stimulus is expansionary, and fi scal contrac-
tion is contractionary. There is a large and growing body of literature that shows that 
fi scal expansion help economy to grow and reduce unemployment in near term; that 
certain types of fi scal stimulus are very effective and that fi scal contractions tend to 
lower output and employment in the short run. Fiscal austerity may be desirable for 
the long-run solvency and health of the economy. But it lowers growth and raises 
unemployment in the near term.
Many conservative politicians and neoliberal economists claim that fi scal austerity – get-
ting the budget defi cit down immediately – would be good for employment and growth. 
Expansionary Fiscal Contractions? 
Estimating effects of fi scal policy is very hard. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) were 
among fi rst to raise possibility of expansionary fi scal contractions. They analyzed Den-
mark and Ireland and found evidence that spending cuts in late 1980s were folowed by 
strong growth in the private sector. In both cases, fi scal consolidation was acompanied 
by a shift in the balance of political power and by complementary monetary and ex-
change rates policies. Both countries experienced a large initial devaluation and then 
they pegged their currencies to the German mark, inducing sharp disinfl ationary proc-
ess and liberalized capital fl ows. Essentially, the fi nal outcome of fi scal conslidations 
was determined by the complementary policies and expectations of future policy they 
induced. But, it is important to emphasize, as Gavazzi and Pagano note, these two cases 
were the exceptions, not the norm! The estimated effect on output is indeed positive, 
although statistically not signifi cant. In addition, two countries had experienced a rapid 
deterioration in their sovereign debt rating, after expansionary fi scal contractions. The 
results also suggest that these two cases are not representative of the normal output re-
sponse, even among countries with a relatively poor initial credit rating (IMF, 2010). 
Later, a very infl uental paper by Alberto Alesina and Silvia Ardagna (2010) found 
that fi scal austerity was generally espansionary. European (and our) policymakers also 
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belive this strongly. German policy makers are fi rm believers in expansionary fi scal 
contraction, which heavily infl uences EU policy response to economic crisis in the eu-
rozone. But this is not conclusive. What Alesina and Ardagna did was to get budget data 
for a large number of advanced countries for  past 35 years. They identifi ed large fi scal 
consolidations and found that output tended to rise on average after these consolida-
tions, particularly those focused on government spending cuts. But, we have to take into 
consideration a problem called by economists: „omitted variable bias“1. Essentially, any 
time looking at the relationship between two variables, you need to worry that a third 
variable is infl uencing both of them. We have learned that omitted variable bias is the 
central problem in this area and in the most empirical research in economics. Failing 
to take account of this omitted variable leads to a biased estimate of the relationship of 
interest. Unfortunately, there turns out that there was a lot of omitted variable bias in 
Alesina and Ardagna’s empirical analysis. This omitted variable bias made it look as 
though defi cit reduction was expansionary, when in reality it was not (Romer, 2011). 
The proponents of radical austerity policy, usually take as a role model of success-
full fi scal adjustments in Baltic countries. But, it is a false hope. Kattel and Raudla 
(2012) published a paper on Baltic Austerity and their main fi ndings are that the Baltics 
essentially „outsourced“ their recovery, through massive use of EU fi scal funds (there 
is high level of uncertainty, because EU funds run out by 2015), deep economic inte-
gration with Scandinavia and Poland and due to uniquely elevated levels of emigration, 
the pace of which has increased since the crisis broke, decreasing high unemployment 
in the Baltics. Lithuania and Latvia experienced particularly large depopulation proc-
ess in 2011. These unique circumstances account for a great deal of the modes growth 
enjoyed by the Baltic economies – but they have little to do with domestic policies. 
In the United Kingdom experts urge George Osborne to make U-turn on austerity. To 
simplify, he has been urged to abandon austerity plans and boost infrastructure spending 
to rescue the economy by the group of 20 top economists who backed his defi cit cutting 
plans just two years ago (Eaton, 2012). The revolt by the same experts whose support for 
the Tory economic strategy was a pivotal moment in the pre-election debate in 2010 will 
be embarassing for the Chancelor. He is already facing calls from IMF and employers 
body the CBI to take action on growth in the wake of double-dip recession. 
Greece says that it needs „breathing room“ to pay debt. The austerity-based fi scal 
adjustment program shows catastrophic effects (Polychroniou, 2012). Greece’s gov-
erning coalition, grappling with the fi fth year of recession and youth unemployment 
of about 50 percent, has said it favors an extension of its fi scal adjustment program 
by two years to 2016. 
Rethinking Austerity 
There are much more careful studies at the IMF (2010), and papers published by 
Robert Skidelsky (2010), Robert Parentau (2010), Christina Romer (2011), Paul Krug-
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man (2012), Brad De Long (2012), Giancarlo Corsetti (2012), Carlo Cottarelli (2012), 
Costas Lapavitsas (2012) and many other researchers. 
For instance, an IMF paper (2010) shows that unemployment and output fell fol-
lowing austerity programs. They identifi ed deliberate consolidation moves in 15 ad-
vanced countries over the last 30 years using narrative analysis. They dealt with 
omitted variable bias. Fiscal contraction in normally contractionary. A fi scal con-
solidation equal to 1 percent of GDP tipically reduces real GDP by about 0,5 percent 
and raises the unemployment rate by about 0,3 percentage points. IMF’s fi ndings are 
consistent with our views that fi scal austerity is pro-cyclical and unemployment has 
risen dramatically after austerity programs. Figure 1 offers a striking image of fi scal 
consolidation episodes and their outcome on GDP growth and unemployment. 
Figure 1. Impact of a 1 Percent of GDP Fiscal Consolidation on GDP and Unem-
ployment
Source: International Monetary Fund (2010)
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Other main fi ndings of the IMF are the following: reductions in interest rates 
usually support output during fi scal consolidation programs (Figure 2); devaluation 
of domestic currency typically plays an important cushioning role by  inducing net 
exports (Figure 2), fi scal consolidation results expand net export, thus changing GDP 
components (Figure 3); and, model simulations suggest that over the long term, re-
ducing debt is likely to be benefi cial. 
Figure 2. Response of Monetary Conditions to a 1 Percent of GDP Fiscal Consolida-
tion
Source: International Monetary Fund (2010)
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Figure 3.  Impact of a 1 Percent of GDP Fiscal Consolidation on GDP Components 
(Percent)
Source: International Monetary Fund (2010)
A comparison of standard approach (Alesina and Ardagna, 2010) and action-based 
approach (IMF, 2010), identifi ed signifi cant differences (Figure 4.). Large fi scal con-
solidations - according to the action-based approach - impact on GDP is negative and 
unemployment rises. 
52 Dubravko Radošević
Figure 4.  Impact of Large Fiscal Consolidation on GDP and Unemployment: Ac-
tion-Based Approach versus Standard Approach (Impact of each additional 
1 percent of GDP fi scal consolidation)
Source: International Monetary Fund (2010)
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The experience of a number of countries currently undergoing fi scal austerity is 
consistent with IMF fi ndings (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, the United Kingdom, 
Italy, Serbia,  Slovenia, Croatia, etc.). 
Brad De Long and Larry Summers (2012) published a paper on the effi ciency of 
discretionary fi scal policy concluding that in severely depressed economies in which 
interest rates are constrained by the zero lower bound discretionary fi scal policy is a 
crucial instrument. Essentially, the analysis suggests that under plausible conditions 
temporary fi scal expansions may actually be self-fi nancing. Even if expansionary 
policies do raise long-term debt levels, the analysis suggests that they may well be 
desirable in certain circumstances. A most important  conclusion is that policies of 
defi cit reduction in the presence of substantial output shortfalls will have adverse 
impacts in both the short and long run, and may even exacerbate creditworthiness 
problems. They suggested that temporary fi scal stimulus are consistent with a per-
ception of long run fi scal consolidation. There is positive experience with temporary 
fi scal expansions and also with phased-in-long-run defi cit reductions. 
Finally, Giancarlo Corsetti et al. (2012) published a paper, which has views of 
leading economists on austerity. The issue has many dimensions. This issue can be 
illustrated by means of fi gures that I borrowed from Corsetti (2012). 
Figure 5.  Short term recession, austerity expansionary 
Source: Corsetti (2012)
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The fi gure conveys a key message. If a recession is not expected to last very long 
(below four quarters), upfront spending cuts cause a moderate fall in output, and 
end up reducing the defi cit. The contractionary impact of the Keynesian multiplier 
is attenuated by the positive effects of the cut on the interest rate on sovereign debt, 
refl ected by private borrrowing costs. However, when the anticipated duration of re-
cession is longer – between one and two years – the results are radically different. 
With a low sensitivity of the sovereign risk premium to future defi cits, the multiplier 
effect dominates and becomes quite large. Because of a large multiplier, upfront cuts 
are self-defeating: the defi cit-to-GDP ratio actually rises. 
Figure 6.  Long term recession, austerity self-defeating
Source: Corsetti (2012)
Essentially, there is a fi ne line between self-defeating and expansionary con-
tractions are quite thin: small differences in expectations and market attitude 
make a large difference on the outcome. In addition, with longer anticipation of 
duration of recession, the economy becomes highly vulnerable to self-fulfi lling 
crises. 
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Cottarelli (2012) analysed correlation between fi scal austerity and market behav-
iour. It shows that lower debt ratios and defi cits lead to lower interest rates on sover-
eign debt, but so does faster short-term growth. So, when countries implement fi scal 
austerity and the economy slows, some of the gains from better fi scal fundamentals 
will be lost through lower growth and long-term fi scal prospects. There is nonlinear 
relationship between growth and sovereign debt spreads (CDS). As Cottarelli men-
tioned in his work, spreads are more likely to increase when growth is already low 
and the fi scal adjustment is large (see Figure 7, that was borrowed from Cottarelli, 
2012). Essentially, if growth falls as a result of austerity measures, interest rates could 
actually rise as the defi cit falls. 
Figure 7. Fiscal adjustment: Double-edged sword?
Fiscal adjustment can help lower spreads on government bonds where the impact on growth is limited. But the 
more fi scal tightening hurts growth, the more it will also cause spreads on government bonds to rise.
Source: Cottarelli, (2012)
To simplify, self-defeating austerity in a depressed economy is the most likely 
outcome of radical fi scal adjustment. Paul Krugman (2012) published a book „End 
This Depression Now“. His policy point of view is that „it really doesn’t matter 
whether austerity in a depressed economy literally hurts a country’s fi scal position 
or merely does very little to help that position. All that we need to know is that the 
payoff to fi scal cuts in times like these is small, possibly nonexistent, while the 
costs are large“. 
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Political Implications of Austerity Measures
Radical austerity policies are losing credibility in the Eurozone. Citizens don’t feel 
that they are succesfull. They don’t think that sacrifi ces deliver promised results. 
With Europe in a double-dip recession, voters rewarded those who opposed auster-
ity measures. There is a growing dissatisfaction of the electorate with the European 
Monetary Union and the current setting of the European institutions. The political 
developments in Europe raise an important consistency issue for the current setting 
of European policies. 
Essentially, can respresentative democracy and the fi scal austerity stay together? 
Radical fi scal austerity, as defl ationary policy, increases unemployment, thus lower-
ing democratic legitimacy of the mainstream political parties and incites political 
polarization. 
Negative political aspects of austerity measures have deep rationale. We might 
add an insight from Michal Kalecki (1943), who wrote an essay „Political Aspects 
of Full Employment“. Basically, Kalecki found that business leaders are opponents 
of public investment policy aimed at restoring full employment. Bussines lobbies 
are focused on private investments and have a veto power over government actions. 
Essentially, defl ationary policies are supported by the bussines lobbies that are more 
rent-seeking and they want to restore „bussines confi dence“ with conservative fi scal 
policy, some kind of radical fi scal adjustment and restrictive monetary policies. In 
his concept of the political business cycle, Kalecki focused atention on a different 
viewpoint of business lobby and the masses of the achivement and maintainance of 
full employment. He analysed the actual mechanism of transmission of economic 
interests of two classes within the institutional framework of parliamentary democ-
racy. Kalecki’s diagnosis was that fi scal austerity and private investment - led growth 
are in best interests of the business community and explains the causes of capitalist’s 
opposition to a permanent full employment. This theory could also explain radical 
austerity strategy applied as a EU response to the eurozone debt crisis. EU response 
to the crisis offers an example of the policies aimed to protect the interests of large 
fi nancial and industrial capital (Lapavitsas, 2012). To simplify, radical austerity leads 
to political instability and unstable democratic institutions. 
In Greece, two mainstream political parties were barely able to form a unstable 
coalition government, while leftist movement Syriza became the second largest po-
litical party. Voters judged the two big parties to be guilty of providing parliamentary 
support to the radical austerity measures. In Italy, technocratic Government lead by 
Mario Monti is losing ground, as a consequence of radical austerity program. Italy 
has large public debt, although their governments are able to run primary budget 
surpluses since the early 1980s. Debts that are big are crippling growth rates, and 
Italy’s economy has been stagnant for more than a decade. The Five-Star Movement 
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won local elections and together with leftist Democratic Party could win parliamen-
tary majority on next general elections. French Socialist Party won the Presidential 
elections, while neo-communist Mellenchon achived notable electoral success. The 
winner Hollande repeatedly made promises that austerity shall not be implemented 
in France. In Germany, The Pirate Party has gathered more than 8 % of the vote in 
Schleswig-Holstein, while CDU and SPD are constantly losing public support and 
the Liberal democrats are fi ghting for survival2. Much the same applies, or will soon 
apply to Portugal, Spain, Slovenia, Serbia, Croatia, Netherlands and other European 
countries. The spectre of anti-austerity movements haunts Europe. As in every Euro-
zone country in crisis austerity policy was meant to reassure the markets, but it had 
the exact opposite effect. The more governments tighten, the more likely they are to 
fall in bad equilibrium.  Essentially, dynamic growth is what matters the most and 
strenghtens the credibility of the country’s fi scal and economic policy. 
Concluding Remarks and Policy Recommendations 
What does all of this evidence mean for policymakers? What is to be done? I don’t 
want to get into detailed policy advice. But there are some broad implications that I 
think are very important. 
A most important  conclusion is that policies of defi cit reduction in the presence of 
substantial output shortfalls will have adverse impacts in both the short and long run, 
and may even exacerbate creditworthiness problems. Radical austerity measures are 
self-defeating, effects of radical fi scal reduction are lower growth process and high-
er unemployment. The resulting unemployment makes the budget defi cit problem 
even worse. Essentially, fi scal austerity leads to higher unemployment which leads 
to higher defi cits and more austerity. The result is bad equilibrium of the economy. 
Recession than turns into economic depression. 
Austerity as economic doctrine and political ideology rationalizes social injustice. 
Radical fi scal adjustment has large redistributional effects3, that serve interests of the 
few (banking industry). Policy makers have to change focus from defi cits and low 
infl ation to job creation and growth. Mass unemployment is a terrible problem. It is 
imperative to get this unemployment down quickly. Specifi c types of fi scal stimulus 
are very effective. The empirical evidence is that fi scal stimulus does raise output and 
employment signifi cantly. 
Policy makers have to come up with a new policy mix, in which non conventional 
monetary policy should be combined with counter - cyclical fi scal policy. Woodford 
(2012) says that fi scal stimulus, such as tax cuts or spending increases, pairing with 
NGDP targeting (because infl ation targeting is not an effective monetary regime in 
defl ationary crisis) would be especially effective as policy intended to boost growth, 
as it would prevent any „crowding out“ of private sector activities or infl ation that 
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could result from increased government spending. Fiscal stimulus should be accom-
panied with a serious plan in order to reduce the fi scal defi cit over time4. 
NOTES
1 The usual approach to fi scal adjustment cases has been focused on swings in the cyclically adjusted 
primary balance (CAPB). But, there are some important methodological problems: standard cyclical 
–adjustment methods fail to remove effects of asset prices or that it ignores the motivation behind 
fi scal actions. Therefore, IMF analysis, rather then focusing on CAPB, look at policy actions. This so-
called „action-based approach“ is closely related to the „narrative approach“ (IMF, 2010; Romer 2011). 
To sum up, the main importance of IMF analysis is that it reduced these bias problems and therefore 
allowed for a better estimation of the casual impact on output of fi scal consolidation (read more at: 
Appendix 3.3.: Identifying Periods of Fiscal Consolidation: The Standard versus the Action-Based 
Approach in IMF, 2010). 
2 Fiscal policy stance by the German political parties has been highly infl uenced by the economic orto-
doxy that has the historical and ideological foundations of German economic thinking in the so-called 
„Ordoliberalism“ (read more at: Dullien and Guerot, 2012). German economic ortodoxy differs from 
mainstream international discourse. It is centered on austerity and low infl ation stabilization policy at 
the expence of economic growth. 
3 Deploying Parentau’s analysis of Sector Financial Balances (Parentau, 2010) allows important con-
clusions on the effi cacy of austerity meaures. Namely, if foreign fi nancial balance does not change radi-
cally, then changes in the fi scal balance must be matched by an equal and opposite adjustment of the 
private sector’s fi nancial balance (because, essentially, Parenatau’s accounting identity is: Domestic 
Private Sector Financial Balance+Fiscal Balance+Foreign Financial Balance=0). If we rearrange the 
fi nancial balance identity as follows, we have:Domestic Private Sector Financial Balance = Current 
Account Balance – Fiscal Balance. If a nation wishes to run a persistent fi scal surplus and thereby 
pay down government debt, it needs to run an even larger trade surplus, or else the domestic private 
sector will be left stuck in a persistent defi cit spending mode. When sustained over time, this nega-
tive cash fl ow position for the domestic private sector will eventually increase the fi nancial fragility 
of the economy, if not insure the proliferation of household and business bankruptcies. It follows that 
austerity policies aimed at reducing public defi cits must be matched by increased private spending. 
Fiscal austerity focused on wage cuts or wage freezes, rising unemployment and uncertainty, will 
decrease private investment and consumption. As a result, austerity strategy will then most likely lead 
to contraction of GDP, rising unemployment and wage defl ation. Austerity strategy will thus become 
self-defeating (read more at: Parentau, 2010). 
4 EU Council has compiled a new Fiscal Compact Treaty on 9 December 2011. Many economists think 
that Fiscal Compact in fact contain budgetary constraints enshrining ‘pro-cyclical fi scal policies’ and 
even outlaw Keynesianism. But, is seems that the Treaty permits a Eurozone member hit by an earth-
quake, natural disaster, or a severe economic blow to undertake temporary fi scal stimulus. Also, if a 
Eurozone has a large output gap, it can implement a fi scal stimulus to reduce it. Current mainstream 
economic thinking suggest that sound fi scal policy has to be based on two main elements: First, it 
should guide an economy towards a moderate and sustainable level of public debt. Second, it should 
keep public debt fl uctuating around this moderate level in a countercyclical fashion. In relation to the 
fi rst element, the compact emphasises the need for an explicit trajectory whereby countries can return 
towards a 60% debt-to-GDP ratio. Far less positive, however, is the so-called golden rule setting a 
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legally binding maximum structural defi cit of a 0.5% of GDP when a country has a debt ratio above 
60% and a maximum of 1% when a country has a debt ratio lower than 60%. Simple analytics shows 
that in relation to long-run debt levels, the so-called „golden rule“ will led, over time, to debt ratios well 
bellow those considered sustainable (Whelan, 2012). 
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